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Background 
In 2011, the South African health minister, proposed a national health insurance (NHI) 
for South Africa with the aim to deliver universal health access and care to all South 
African residential citizens, with a single fund to cover all people, no matter their income. 
The first five years were reached at the end of year 2017-2018. In order to achieve 
universal health coverage (UHC), primary health care (PHC) re-engineering and NHI have 
been chosen as key strategic interventions to be implemented. These reforms are 
currently being piloted in 11 selected districts in South Africa since 2011. 
Methods 
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the proposed South African NHI 
financing reforms (wishes) versus what has been implemented to date (current financing 
and service delivery reality on the ground) highlighting potential stumbling blocks. A 
review of both published and grey literature mainly sourced from the departments of 
health South Africa, statistics South Africa, world health organisation and world bank 
reports was carried out. Key documents reviewed included the South African national 
health insurance whitepaper, South African governmental financial reports, health 
systems trust reviews, mid-term report on universal health coverage and World Bank 
report on appropriate universal health coverage financing, progress reports on UHC and 
published research from leading health economists. 
Results 
Independent medical schemes, people as taxpayers and as consumers, rampant 
unemployment, lack of trust in public institutions and regressive aspects of value added 
tax, budgets, fickle political will, corruption, drivers of private health costs, 
provincialization as opposed to district health authorities, incompetent leadership and a 
cocktail of epidemics were revealed as potential stumbling blocks. 
Conclusions 
As international support for UHC grows pace, the issue of how to finance improved 
financial protection and access to needed health services becomes ever more urgent. 
Exploring how the proposed South Africa national health insurance UHC financing 
reforms compare and contrast with the situation on the ground, helps highlight potential 
stumbling blocks that need addressing as SA moves towards UHC. The paper concludes by 
calling for innovative, inclusive and sustainable UHC financing and service delivery 
solutions and the upholding of political will and commitments made, if South Africa is to 
achieve UHC by 2026. 
The introduction of national health insurance (NHI), 
aimed at achieving universal coverage, is the most impor-
tant issue currently on the South African health policy 
agenda.1 In 2011, the then health minister, Aaron Mot-
soaledi, proposed a national health insurance for South 
Africa with the aim to deliver universal health care and ac-
cess to all South African residential citizens, with a single 
fund to cover all people no matter their income. NHI is 
based on the principle of the constitutional right of citizens 
to have access to quality healthcare services that are de-
livered equitably, affordably, efficiently, effectively and ap-
propriately based on social solidarity, progressive univer-
salism, equity and health as a public good and a social in-
vestment.2 National health insurance aims to transform the 
financing of healthcare in pursuit of financial risk protec-
tion, by eliminating fragmentation, ensuring technical and 
allocative efficiencies in how funds are collected, pooled 
and used to purchase services, thus creating a unified health 
system that will move closer to the goal of UHC and sustain-
able development goals (SDG) by 2030.2,3 The goal is to ex-
tend population coverage, improve the quality and quanti-
ty of services that the population are entitled to, provide fi-
nancial risk protection to individuals and households whilst 
reducing the direct costs that the population are exposed to 
when accessing healthcare. It also aims to protect individu-
als and households from out-of-pocket expenses and finan-
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cial catastrophe related to healthcare.2,4 
CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
South Africa’s health system is largely inefficient and un-
equal. Despite certain areas of progress in the country since 
1994, disparities in wealth and health are among the widest 
in the world.5 South Africa spends 8.5% of its gross domes-
tic product (GDP) on health care, or around R332 billion in 
monetary terms; half is spent in the private sector cater-
ing for the socio-economic elite. The remaining 84% of the 
population, who carry a far greater burden of disease, de-
pend on the under-resourced public sector.6 Those with the 
means can access first-world health care through the pri-
vate sector, while many people who cannot afford this ser-
vice, are left to rely on governmental hospitals and clinics. 
The service through government institutions is largely un-
reliable and fails to offer adequate specialist services.7 The 
intent of the reform is also to integrate the existing private 
schemes into NHI since medical aids are making huge prof-
its and consumers in the private sector too, are not getting 
fair value for their money.8 
Powerful historical and social forces, such as vast income 
inequalities, unemployment, poverty, racial and gender dis-
crimination, the migrant labour system, the destruction of 
family life and extreme violence characterize South Africa.9 
In addition, the country is faced with a quadruple burden 
of diseases, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, high maternal neona-
tal and child morbidity and mortality, rising burden of non-
communicable diseases and high levels of violence and 
trauma. These diseases negatively impact the poorest 
groups of the population.10 Leadership and governance 
challenges remain prevalent in the various levels of the 
public sector despite efforts by government to inculcate a 
culture of good leadership and governance, the knowledge 
and skills amongst managers is still very inadequate.2,6,10 
Ongoing assessments of public sector facilities continue to 
reveal quality problems in the areas of staff attitudes, wait-
ing times, cleanliness, drug stock-outs, infection control, 
and safety and security of staff and patients, despite efforts 
that have been made to address these challenges.2,11 Only 
a third of state facilities pass muster, which means a small 
number of these institutions would be able to provide good 
quality healthcare at the moment.12 NHI plans to address 
such issues and in general increase the health of the popu-
lation. Healthier people, inevitably live longer, work longer 
and will no doubt benefit the economy.4 
Two vehicles that have been selected to achieve UHC are 
NHI and PHC re-engineering. Healthcare services will be 
provided through an integrated system involving accredited 
and contracted public and private providers. The PHC ser-
vices include health promotion, disease prevention, cura-
tive (acute and chronic clinical) services, rehabilitation and 
palliative services (including social services). PHC Re-engi-
neering will be implemented through four streams namely; 
municipal ward-based primary health care outreach teams 
(WBPHCOTs); integrated school health programme; district 
clinical specialist teams; and contracting-in of private 
health practitioners at non-specialist level under the lead-
ership of district health management offices (DHMOs). The 
planned interventions outlined will be undertaken through-
out the 14-year phased implementation of NHI 
(2012-2026).4 
PLANNED NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE FINANCING 
REFORM 
NHI supports changes in service delivery by a series of fi-
nancing and management changes designed to raise more 
funds, manage the funds efficiently and effectively, increase 
pooling and purchasing. It is worth mentioning that the 
health financing system does not act alone in achieving 
UHC goals, hence coordinated policy and implementation 
across health system functions are essential for making 
progress on the desired objectives, such as improving the 
quality of care (Box 1). 
Box 1. National health insurance 
reforms aims2 
UHC means that people have access to the health care 
services that they need without undue financial hardships. 
UHC is commonly understood to consist of three interrelat-
ed components: the population covered, the range of ser-
vices made available; and the extent of financial protection 
from the costs of health services.13–15 The purpose of this 
paper is to compare and contrast the proposed South 
African NHI financing reforms (wishes) versus what has 
been implemented to date (current financing and service 
delivery reality on the ground), highlighting potential 
stumbling blocks on the road to UHC. The paper concludes 
by calling for innovative, inclusive and sustainable UHC fi-
nancing solutions and upholding of political will and com-
mitments made if South Africa is to achieve UHC by 2026. 
METHODS 
The findings presented in this paper are from a review of 
both published and grey literature mainly sourced from the 
departments of health South Africa, statistics South Africa, 
world health organisation and world bank reports. Key doc-
uments reviewed included the South African national 
health insurance whitepaper, South African governmental 
financial reports health systems trust reviews, mid-term re-
1. To move beyond the existing fragmented 
public and private health financing systems to 
create a common modern universal health fi-
nancing system which is cost-effective, trusted 
by citizens and provides protection against cost-
ly health services 
2. To move from voluntary to mandatory pre-
payment system 
3. To raise additional revenue for healthcare 
4. To improve pooling arrangements so as to 
better spread risk and improve cross-subsidisa-
tion 
5. To purchase from a mix of public and private 
providers 
6. To use economies of scale and purchasing 
methods to achieve cost-efficiency 
7. To deliver quality services and continual im-
provements in health outcomes 
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port on universal health coverage and world bank report on 
appropriate universal health coverage financing, progress 
reports on UHC and published research from leading health 
economists. 
The world health report 2010, summarizes three broad fi-
nancing strategies as: more money for health" (raising more 
funds); strength in numbers" (larger pools); and more 
health for the money" (improving efficiency and equity in 
the use of funds through reforms in purchasing and pooling 
as well as actions not directly related to health financing).16 
We utilized this framework as a guide. Each national 
health insurance financing proposal mechanism as set out 
in the whitepaper was analysed in respect to key broad 
health financing functions namely revenue generation, 
pooling and purchasing, comparing and contrasting pro-
posed NHI Financial reforms, wishes vs reality, current 
South African financing and service delivery situation on 
the ground. Potential stumbling blocks were identified and 
discussed with evidence from literature bearing in mind 
that South Africa, like many countries, still faces problems 
with access to quality health services, cognizant of the fact 
that financing policy alone cannot address these prob-
lems.16 
DISCUSSION 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCKS TO NHI REFORMS 
Financing universal health coverage (UHC) is not only about 
how to generate funds for health services. It is also about 
how these funds are pooled and used to purchase services17 
hence it is important to consider contextual factors that 
may limit or enable what can be implemented and achieved 
in a given country.17,18 We will discuss the proposed nation-
al health insurance financing reforms point by point and 
compare the wishes in the white paper vs reality on the 
ground as well as highlight potential stumbling blocks to 
achieving them (see Online Supplementary Document for a 
summary table of wishes versus reality of the UHC financ-
ing in South Africa). 
NHI FINANCIAL REFORM POINT 1: TO MOVE BEYOND 
THE EXISTING FRAGMENTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
HEALTH FINANCING SYSTEMS 
NHI plans to do the above through among other measures 
combining the existing medical schemes into the larger uni-
versal scheme covering everyone, so as to create one large 
pool. The legislation is yet to be enacted but some stum-
bling blocks seem to lie ahead e.g. the resistance from the 
medical schemes themselves, a very strong and influential 
player in the South African health sector.19 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: MEDICAL SCHEMES 
AS A KEY STAKEHOLDER 
Private medical schemes have been reported as standing in 
the way of the government’s proposed National Health In-
surance (NHI). The health minister, on the other hand re-
iterated that the purpose of the NHI is not to destroy the 
private healthcare sector, but to make it possible for more 
South Africans to access quality healthcare stressing that 
his point is that private healthcare has a lot of resources 
which are not available to everyone. The above statements 
reveal some tensions and how these are playing out in im-
peding or promoting UHC is not very clear.20 The monopo-
listic position of private hospital companies (used primarily 
by white and wealthy population groups) gives companies’ 
power in the health system and strong interests in purchas-
ing reforms and this is likely to give them at least covert 
power in UHC policy debates.19 With the proposed NHI re-
forms medical aid scheme membership is likely to decline to 
about 10% of population and this is not likely to bode well 
with those with vested interests.19 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 2: PEOPLE AS 
TAXPAYERS AND CONSUMERS OF HEALTH SERVICES 
The poor state of many public healthcare services is another 
shortfall. Many medical scheme members, who are faced 
with spiralling above-inflation annual contribution with 
schemes announcing double-digit contribution increases 
for 2017, are afraid to resign from their schemes and rely 
on state medical care because of the long lines of patients 
waiting to be seen, and the inconsistency of the quality of 
care they are likely to receive if they are hospitalised among 
other reasons. For low-cost benefit options to become a re-
ality, fundamental changes need to be made to the Medical 
Schemes Act of 1998 with regards to the payments for the 
270 prescribed minimum benefits (PMBs), the treatment of 
which all schemes have to cover. This contributes to large 
contribution increases. On the other hand, if people resign 
from medical schemes because of the high cost, they be-
come reliant on state healthcare, adding to the burden of 
the already overloaded and understaffed public health ser-
vice. On a positive note, many people feel they would sup-
port the proposed NHI if the state could prove that it is ca-
pable of revamping the existing state healthcare system.20 
This revamping phase began in 2012 and the results are 
mixed.12 Reforms to the public system and its ability to con-
tract out will need to work to give people confidence in the 
NHI and the new system. There is also the lack of progress 
in establishing the structures for community participation 
in primary healthcare service delivery- clinic committees 
and hospital boards. While all the districts were reported 
to have hospital boards and clinic committees, there is lit-
tle detail about how these bodies function and the extent 
to which they facilitated meaningful community participa-
tion.21 
NHI FINANCING REFORM 2: TO MOVE FROM 
VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY PREPAYMENT SYSTEM 
Transforming the health care financing system also requires 
changing how revenue is collected to fund healthcare ser-
vices and, even more importantly, how generated funds are 
pooled and how quality services are purchased.2,22 The key 
focus of the NHI reforms is therefore to create a single, pub-
licly owned and administered strategic purchaser that will 
actively purchase healthcare services on behalf of the en-
tire population from suitably accredited public and private 
providers. 
General tax is the preferred option of funding.23 The fis-
cal context in a country affects the ability of a government 
to mobilize public revenues overall, which in turn affects 
the level available to fund health services.21 The fiscal situ-
ation in a country is affected by a wide range of factors, in-
cluding the level of poverty and economic growth, the com-
position of the labour market.21 What has been allocated 
so far to achieve UHC in South Africa? The White Paper 
released in December 2015, fails to lay out or discuss any 
specifics such as how much insurance premiums are going 
to cost. Only estimates are given as to what it might cost 
to bring the National Health project to life. The cost of im-
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plementation is estimated to be at R225 billion by 2025, but 
with the economy still under a large amount of pressure, 
many South Africans are wary about whether this can be 
done.21 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: RAMPANT 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
It is worth noting that there are 13.1 million South Africans 
who have regular work – just 41 per cent of the working-age 
population. Of these, just over 8 million have formal, non-
agricultural employment. To achieve the average emerging 
markets employment ratio of 56 per cent, and taking into 
account population growth, South Africa would have to cre-
ate 9 million jobs over the next 10 years. The unemploy-
ment rate is particularly high for young people.24 Only 39% 
of South Africans have a job with half of the population 
between 18 and 25 unemployed, thereby constraining the 
tax base.25 So one stumbling block is where will the money 
come from?20 How can premiums be collected from an in-
formal sector where it is complex to work out whether peo-
ple can afford to pay or not? Who will pay for those who 
cannot afford in a country with high unemployment levels 
and such a small tax base? 
NHI FINANCING REFORM 3: TO RAISE ADDITIONAL 
REVENUE FOR HEALTHCARE 
The government also offers to explore other sources of 
funds e.g. to raise up to 5% of the GDP in additional taxes. 
What could stand in the way here is that South Africa al-
ready has a high per capita expenditure on health (8.8% of 
GDP in 2014 according to the World Health Organisation) 
considering that the average income of South Africans is 
fairly low. South Africa spends more on health per capita 
than many other African countries, yet these countries 
achieve similar or better positive health outcomes. Van den 
Heever argues that there is no precedent elsewhere that 
such a proposal - to raise up to 5% of GDP in additional 
taxes will address the weaknesses in the current health sys-
tem.26 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: LACK OF TRUST IN 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND REGRESSIVE ASPECTS OF 
VAT 
Proposals for increasing government revenues include the 
introduction of a payroll tax, a surcharge on taxable in-
come, and increases in VAT. This money would go into a 
pooled NHI fund which will be publicly administered. Fears 
exist that this money might not be used as intended, cou-
pled with feasibility concerns that these proposals are not 
implementable as.20 An additional concern is that the re-
gressive aspects of a value-added tax increase would con-
tradict the principles upon which NHI is based.2 As of April 
2018 value-added tax (VAT) was raised by one percentage 
point to 15%.27 It remains to be seen if this additional rev-
enue is injected into UHC. 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 2: BUDGETS 
The global financial crisis and subsequent recession have 
exposed vulnerabilities and structural imbalances in major 
economies. Income levels have diverged sharply in many 
countries including South Africa. The recent slow pace of 
economic growth is also a fundamental factor that has con-
tributed to the slow pace of poverty alleviation.25 
Access to opportunity in South Africa is no longer cast 
rigidly along racial lines, but for poor communities the bar-
riers to progress still seem insurmountable. Marginalised 
communities around the world now have access to advanced 
information technology and aspire to a better life, yet stable 
earning opportunities, income security and modern infra-
structure amenities remain out of reach for hundreds of 
millions of people.28 
Spending on the health sector has grown strongly over 
the past years, from R63 billion in 2007/08 to R102.5 billion 
2010/11. Expenditure was expected to grow to R113 billion 
in 2011/12 and R127 billion in 2013/14 – an average annual 
growth rate of 7.5 per cent. The function is allocated an ad-
ditional R18.7 billion over the medium term (R3.6 billion in 
2011/12, R6.5 billion in 2012/13 and R8.6 billion in 2013/
14).28 South Africa’s real gross domestic product fell by 
2.2% in the first quarter of 2018.29 2.2% fall is the largest 
quarter-on-quarter decline since the first quarter of 2009.30 
How this will affect NHI is yet to unfold. 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING 3: POLITICAL WILL IS FICKLE 
UHC is viewed as a political choice and not a technical 
one. The technical means are there. Different countries will 
take different routes but UHC is within reach if citizens 
are empowered for health care.13 It’s not just the govern-
ment or the politicians that are responsible. NGOs, advoca-
cy groups, and international organizations also have a role 
to play in calling attention to persistent inequities and to 
other issues that are detracting from UHC financing. Every-
one has their role in translating these commitments into 
action.13 Political will is fickle, and requires constant vigi-
lance to sustain, especially in low- and middle-income set-
tings, governments face myriad competing priorities.31 
How this political will-will be sustained in the South 
African context is not clear. A collective political will from 
local to national government is critical for the sustainability 
and the effectiveness of the system as it draws resistance 
from other sectors.32 In 2018, South Africa elected a new 
President. How will this political change affect NHI?31 
NHI FINANCING REFORM 4: TO IMPROVE POOLING 
ARRANGEMENTS SO AS TO BETTER SPREAD RISK AND 
IMPROVE CROSS-SUBSIDISATION 
National Health Insurance (NHI) is a health financing sys-
tem that is designed to pool funds to provide access to 
quality, affordable personal health services for all South 
Africans based on their health needs, irrespective of their 
socioeconomic status. NHI is intended to ensure that the 
use of health services does not result in financial hardships 
for individuals and their families. It is envisaged to create 
a unified health system by improving equity in financing, 
reducing fragmentation in funding pools, and by making 
health care delivery more affordable and accessible for the 
population and ultimately eliminate out-of-pocket pay-
ments when the population needs to access health care ser-
vices. In the long run, households will also benefit from in-
creased disposable income as a result of a significantly low-
er mandatory prepayment.4 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: MEDICAL SCHEMES 
INDEPENDENT 
In the current system of medical schemes, only those be-
longing to medical schemes are able to access health ser-
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vices in both the private and the public sectors or access at 
high out-of-pocket costs. There are more than 100 medical 
schemes in South Africa, and each scheme has a number of 
benefit packages, so there is considerable fragmentation in-
to many small risk pools. There is no risk pooling between 
the tax-funded pool and the medical schemes. The public-
private mix is the main equity challenge: while schemes 
cover less than 14% of the population about 60% of funds 
are in the private sector.33 Even those with Medical Insur-
ance are usually denied access to health care before the year 
ends because they are supposed to have run out of bene-
fits. The biggest share of out-of-pocket payments is attrib-
utable to medical scheme members, either in the form of 
co-payments or on services that are not covered under the 
benefit package.17 In spite of this, health care services from 
the private sector are perceived as faster and better making 
people willing to sacrifice. The problem however is that the 
amount people spend on medical schemes is not state-con-
trolled, as it is currently a private transaction between in-
dividuals and healthcare providers and/or medical schemes. 
Medical scheme members are unlikely to hand over these 
high contributions to the state to fund the NHI20 with-
out the assurance of an equivalent service in return. For 
a detailed review please refer to table 1 UHC wish vs re-
ality above. The longer-term role of medical schemes is a 
more complex issue.22,34 The consequences of health care 
providers being the ‘price makers’ in the private health sec-
tor context in South Africa is precisely what the Competi-
tion Commissions’ Health Market Inquiry is grappling with 
at present.22,34 
NHI FINANCING REFORM 5: TO PURCHASE FROM A MIX 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROVIDERS 
NHI plans to purchase services for all; and will be an entity 
that actively utilises its power as a single purchaser to 
proactively identify population health needs and determine 
the most appropriate, efficient and effective mechanisms 
for drawing on existing health care service providers.2 Cur-
rently nine provincial health departments are the major 
purchasers of the public sector health services and the ma-
jority of tax funds flow via these financing intermediaries. 
Purchasing of services is relatively passive.17 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: ALLEGED 
CORRUPTION IN THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
South Africa currently faces issues of looting, corruption, 
factionalism and nepotism.9,24,35 A further layer of com-
plexity has been added with the centralised implementation 
and direct management of the pilot NHI districts by the na-
tional department of health. The implementation process 
has challenged the authority of the provincial health de-
partments, who are responsible for policy implementation. 
Although the NHI pilot district implementation is accom-
panied by strong political stewardship, only time will tell 
whether these reforms will result in significant decentrali-
sation and its intended health service benefits.6 
An earlier analysis of the underlying factors behind over-
spending in provincial health departments pointed to se-
rious management flaws and leadership gaps, particularly 
with regard to the health department’s core business of 
service delivery and the quality of such service delivery.10 
Fragmented health service planning, often unrelated to fi-
nancial and human resource requirements; inadequate: 
health programme linkages, co-ordination and integration 
both within the national health department, and between 
national and provincial health departments; and 10 de facto 
health departments rather than one strong national health 
system, mitigated optimal performance of the health sys-
tem.10 Years later the situation seems not to have 
changed.36 
Over the four-year period from the financial year 2009/
10 to 2012/13, around R24 billion of combined provincial 
health expenditure was classified as irregular by the audi-
tor-general of South Africa. In the 2012/13 financial year 
alone, irregular spending amounted to around 6% of com-
bined provincial health expenditure in South Africa.36 
There were also varying and erratic expenditure patterns in 
the nine provinces. The reality is that it is not known how 
much of the irregular expenditure is due to corruption, be-
cause of difficulties with direct measures or validated in-
dicators to measure corruption.36 One can only postulate 
different scenarios: a worst-case scenario where R24 billion 
was lost due to corruption over a four-year period, or the 
best-case scenario where R24 billion was lost due to inep-
titude or incompetence of public servants and inefficient 
management systems; the consequences of either of these 
scenarios are equally disastrous for the public health sector, 
and the people whom it serves.36 Suboptimal audit out-
comes for the nine provincial health departments have also 
been reported.6 
The fault lines mentioned above have negative conse-
quences for implementation of policies including UHC, and 
could explain the large gap between these policies and their 
implementation, making it difficult to achieve the desired 
results.6 Many inefficiencies emanate from mismanage-
ment and maladministration.25 Raising sufficient money 
for health is imperative, but just having the money will not 
ensure universal coverage, nor will removing financial bar-
riers to access through prepayment and pooling. The final 
requirement is to ensure resources are used efficiently.23 
NHI FINANCING REFORM 6: TO USE ECONOMIES OF 
SCALE AND PURCHASING METHODS TO ACHIEVE COST-
EFFICIENCY 
NHI Fund will assess the population needs to determine 
health service requirements and to ensure that the required 
services are available through purchasing these services 
from accredited public and private providers.4 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: DRIVERS OF PRIVATE 
HEALTH COSTS 
While medical schemes themselves are not run for profit, 
private healthcare facilities are. Private hospitals have 
shareholders and are profit-driven. There is also no limit to 
what private healthcare practitioners may charge.20 These 
two things, together with medicine and equipment costs 
and the falling rand, contribute to spiralling medical 
scheme contributions, regardless of where it is obtained. 
The consequences of health care providers being the ‘price 
makers’ in the private health sector context in South Africa 
is precisely what the Competition Commissions’ Health 
Market Inquiry is grappling with at present.22,22 Those with 
vested interests are bound to resist proposals that will re-
sult in the decline of profits.19 
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NHI FINANCING REFORM 7: TO DELIVER QUALITY 
SERVICES AND CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH 
OUTCOMES 
The NHI fund will be responsible for purchasing and paying 
for all health service needs in the country.4 Only 30% of the 
public health institutions have passed muster meaning very 
few facilities will be accredited to provide care while as the 
costly private sector is characterized by escalating costs.12 
Legislation and other tools have not yet gone far enough 
to regulate the private health care sector. Service delivery 
reforms have produced mixed results and only a third of 
the public facilities have passed muster. It is also impor-
tant to highlight that accreditation status is very dynam-
ic with quality of services sensitive to leadership and staff 
changes. There has also been a lack of adequate infrastruc-
tural improvement in the pilot districts. Progress in reforms 
being piloted has been slow due to poor coordination be-
tween the National Department of Health (NDoH) and the 
Department of Public Works.21 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 1: PROVINCIALIZATION 
AS OPPOSED TO DISTRICT HEALTH AUTHORITIES 
Additional challenges derive from the constitutional auton-
omy of provincial health departments as these create con-
ditions for different interpretations of what constitutes a 
district health system and the structures and mechanisms 
that are most appropriate to ensure implementation.37 The 
current districts are not functioning as decentralised au-
thorities as originally intended; the head of the provincial 
department of health remains the accounting officer, and 
there are marked variations in financial and human re-
source delegations across provinces.38 The problems are ex-
acerbated by human resource shortages, suboptimal stew-
ardship and leadership, and political contestations that col-
lectively slow progress towards quality services and ulti-
mately accreditation, an NHI requirement. According to the 
White Paper on NHI, primary health care re-engineering 
is at the core of revitalising and strengthening the South 
African health system and this is dependent upon a well-
functioning district health system. 22 years into democracy, 
South Africa still does not have a fully functional district 
health system.4 A functional DHS is expected to ensure 
the delivery of quality, equitable PHC services,39 improve 
health outcomes for all South Africans40 (but especially 
those worst off), address the social determinants of health, 
involve communities, and change the power relations be-
tween the centre (province) and the periphery (the dis-
trict).41 Formal mechanisms of accountability such as dis-
trict councils and clinic or community health centre com-
mittees are either absent or not playing a meaningful role. 
In addition, district hospitals still function separately from 
and are poorly co-ordinated with PHC services in many 
places. Without the appropriate delegations, district health 
managers cannot make decisions. Hence, the perceived 
benefits of decentralisation, namely accountability to com-
munities, improved health outcomes and access to quality 
services, have not been realised.37 The largest public spend-
ing is by provincial departments of health at 3.8 per cent 
of GDP and the largest private spending channel is through 
medical schemes (3.7 per cent of GDP).4,42 Funds are al-
located from central government to provinces (for all sec-
tors) using a needs-based formula and then each province 
has autonomy to decide on how it will allocate these funds 
to individual sectors e.g. health and education.33 Provinces 
therefore command both financial and administrative pow-
er. 
There are concerns about the undoubtedly lengthy 
process required to implement many of the NHI reforms 
such as delegating management authority to all public hos-
pitals and organisations such as PHC services.22,34 A DHS 
is pivotal to UHC according to WHO, which emphasizes the 
well-functioning of the entire health system of which the 
DHS is a part. Whether the financial and ideological chal-
lenges will undermine this intent in South Africa, is not 
known. The roll-out of NHI programs to all districts may re-
quire a rethinking of the salience of the DHS.21 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 2: INCOMPETENCE AND 
FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE AT ALL 
LEVELS OF THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
According to Rispel 2016, there are fault lines in the health 
sector that have negative consequences for patients, health 
professionals and policy implementation. These include: 
tolerance of ineptitude and leadership, management and 
governance failures, lack of a fully functional district health 
system, which is the main vehicle for the delivery of primary 
health care (PHC), inability or failure to deal decisively with 
the health workforce crisis.6 
Rispel 2016, goes on to highlight the problem of ineffec-
tive management, incompetence and failure of leadership 
and governance at all levels of the health system, exacer-
bated by a general lack of accountability despite there being 
many committed, competent, hard-working health service 
managers and health professionals, contributing to change 
and doing an excellent job in implementing transformative 
health policies.6 These fault lines stand in the way of im-
proved public sector services to compete with the private 
sector, let alone to get the needed accreditation to become 
an NHI provider. 
POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK 3: HIGH HIV BURDEN 
AND A COCKTAIL OF EPIDEMICS 
South Africa has the highest number of people on ARVs. 
Nearly 3million of the 6.4million people infected get free 
treatment and the new test and treat approach the health 
system will need substantially more nurses. This means a 
doubling or tripling of health workers an expensive, difficult 
and time-consuming exercise that will pay off if the country 
invests now in treating more people. If South Africa were to 
offer ARVs to everyone who qualifies under the government 
guidelines, it would cost R50-billion, more than double the 
R21-billion the state currently spends.11 The effect of the 
HIV epidemic on UHC efforts cannot be underestimated. 
With the introduction of a massive ARV program, non-
communicable diseases are now the single largest cause of 
death. The 2015 overview of cause of death graphically de-
picts what is known as the quadruple burden of disease 
(HIV, maternal mortality, violence and NCDs), whereby 
South Africa faces substantial mortality in all four of the 
main categories of cause of death.22,34 Public health in-
frastructure is poorly located, inadequate and under-main-
tained.24 South Africa currently falls short of UHC goals 
in many respects, including its system inputs (particularly 
physical infrastructure), outputs (e.g. health service utilisa-
tion rates), outcomes (inadequate service coverage) and im-
pact-poor health status.43 Health system needs evolve over 
time. A health system that was designed for a 20th cen-
tury demographic and epidemiological South Africa cannot 
serve us well any more44 calling for a health system over-
haul led by innovative leadership.44 
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LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS 
We would like to acknowledge that our presentation of po-
tential stumbling blocks to NHI monetary reforms are an 
attempt to raise awareness but our list is not exhaustive. 
There might be other stumbling blocks we did not allude 
to in our paper. WHO identified in its World Health Report 
(2010)23 that the area that is likely to have the greatest im-
pact on improving equity will concern reforming the health 
financing system.3 To the best of our knowledge, this is 
one of the first papers to compare and contrast the pro-
posed NHI financing reforms in South Africa (wish) with 
the situation on the ground (reality) highlighting potential 
stumbling blocks. It is very important for countries to track 
progress towards national goals including UHC.45 
CONCLUSIONS 
Progress towards UHC has been reported in some NHI pilot 
districts.21 Sustaining change and preserving gains 
achieved in the move towards UHC in South Africa is a 
mammoth task. Policy implementation is not linear and un-
intended consequences, resistance by some interest groups, 
need to be negotiated and managed particularly the private 
sector with vested interests.19 There are ambitious reforms 
planned for financing and purchasing arrangements 
through the NHI.46 There are ambitious reforms for reform-
ing PHC re-engineering to raise the quality of services in 
the public health system under the NHI.46 There are many 
stumbling blocks that have been discussed – partly whether 
there is the political will to see the reforms through, 
whether the tax and service delivery systems can be re-
formed enough including eliminating corruption and im-
proving leadership and efficiencies, whether powerful 
groups such as the medical schemes, the elite and the pri-
vate hospitals will allow come to the table and put their 
weight behind the NHI reforms. We reckon that South 
Africa has a relatively high per capita spending on health, if 
only the funds available are pooled and well managed, ac-
cess to quality health services for all South Africans can be 
guaranteed.43 UHC is viewed as a political choice and not a 
technical one. The technical means are there but different 
countries will take different routes.47 UHC is within reach 
if citizens are empowered and political will is present.47 
Innovative and sustainable UHC financing and pressure to 
the state to uphold the political will and commitments are 
called for if South Africa is to achieve UHC by 2026. Cur-
rently there is an imbalance in power within an unregulat-
ed health system, in favour of health care providers. Achiev-
ing UHC requires the right policies48 many of which South 
Africa is yet to implement. Some of the unresolved issues 
are: the economy is unsustainably resource intensive24; the 
public health system cannot meet demand or sustain qual-
ity currently; public services are uneven and often of poor 
quality; corruption levels are high; and South Africa re-
mains a divided society.24 
The underlying political and social determinants that 
undermine access to care must also be tackled to achieve 
the broader equity and effectiveness goals of UHC.3 Achiev-
ing UHC for all populations requires the harmonisation of 
political, social, economic, and health leadership, as well as 
mature health systems capable of ensuring efficiency and 
equity.49 As South Africa moves into putting legal, institu-
tional frameworks and systems for UHC implementation in-
to place,50 caution has to be taken as political trade-offs are 
made on the road to UHC, the needs of less powerful groups 
may not necessarily given priority.3 The market won’t work 
– it doesn’t work well in the health context.51 How much 
South Africa takes heed of the above words of wisdom is yet 
to be seen. 
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